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A TOUGHER ROAD TO CONVICTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPT PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN A POSTMCDONNELL WORLD
David Paul Dornette*

I. INTRODUCTION
Money in politics is a legal and practical reality. Routine political
courtesies and constituent services for those who support a politician are
an integral part of a representative democracy. A major part of a
representative’s job is to regularly meet and speak with constituents to
better understand their needs. The public official’s job is to advocate for
those needs. A byproduct of our democratic system, rooted in privately
funded campaigns, is that representatives voice most passionately for
those who support them – and the best way to support a politician is
through political donations. Today, a candidate is unlikely to win an
election without significant campaign contributions.
Due to campaign fundraising and lobbying activity, politicians are
inevitably tempted with illicit payments. The essence of Corruption
occurs when politicians cease acting for the good of their constituents
and instead seek to enrich themselves.1 The quintessential act of
corruption is taking secret payments in exchange for political favors.
Corruption is reviled and intolerable because it betrays trust at the
highest level. Our own Constitution puts it in the same category as
treason.2 It “destroys democracy, replacing the vote of the people with
the vote of the dollar.”3 The line between routine political contributions
for influence and illegal secret payments in exchange for political favors
is murky. But one the courts have continuously attempted to maintain.
The current system of federal bribery legislation is not a coherent
scheme of offenses but rather “a patchwork of statutes aimed at corrupt
public officials, some by design and others by accident.”4 The difficulty
lies in the statutes’ broad definition of corruption, because politicians
routinely solicit funds for re-election. Justice White stated that these
* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Randall Eliason, Sheldon Silver, Bob McDonnell, and the Sorry State of Public Corruption
Law, Sidebars Blog (July 19, 2017), https://sidebarsblog.com/sheldon-silver-bob-mcdonnell-sorry-statepublic-corruption-law/.
2. U.S. Const. art II, §4. (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors”).
3. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation, 225 (2002).
4. John Gawey, Hobbs Leviathan: The Dangerous Breadth of the Hobbs Act and Other
Corruption Statutes, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 383, 418 (2013).
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broad definitions of corruption:
would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been
thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very
real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are
financed by private contributions [,] as they have been from the
beginning of the Nation.5
These broad and poorly defined statues led to a constant battle of
interpretation between the Department of Justice and the Supreme
Court..6 Courts have “squeezed and stretched” the statute’s language for
decades, trying to maintain a balance between two vitally important
public interests: a constituent oriented representative government and
stomping out corruption.7
The most recent Supreme Court ruling on corruption law may also be
the most significant. The seminal holding in United States v. McDonnell
narrowed the definition of what constitutes an “official act” under
federal bribery statutes.8 The Court attempted to preserve the line
between legal constituent services and graft by establishing a bright-line
rule. But in doing so, the Court raised the bar for corruption prosecution
to a rigorously high standard.
This paper will argue the ruling in McDonnell was a necessary
decision that brought much needed clarity to corruption law. But, as
with all new laws and legal standards, there are repercussions; some
positive and some negative. Perhaps the most negative consequence is
the recent reversal of convictions of corrupt public officials. Across the
country, corrupt politicians have had their convictions overturned
because the jury instructions used to convict, although correct at the
time of trial, are no longer valid under the McDonnell standard. The first
was Sheldon Silver, ex-Speaker of the New York General Assembly,
whose prosecution provides a useful case study in what the future of
corruption prosecution will look like in a post-McDonnell world.
Part II of this paper gives the background of the federal bribery
statutes and how the courts have interpreted them. It discusses Sheldon
Silver’s alleged corruption scheme, trial, and conviction. Next, it
addresses the holding in McDonnell and why it compelled overturning
Silver’s conviction. Part III will first discuss the future of anticorruption law and prosecution, and then apply it to what the expected
outcome of Sheldon Silver’s retrial should be. It will then conclude with
5.
6.
7.
8.

McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991).
See Gawey, supra note 4 at 386.
Id. at 417.
McDonnell v United States, 579 U.S. 1 (2016).
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proposed solutions to alleviate concerns that also work in conjuncture
with McDonnell.
II. BACKGROUND
Before Sheldon Silver earned the title “convicted criminal,” he was
referred to by a different name: Speaker of the New York State
Assembly where he had the reputation of being “the state’s most
powerful Democrat.”9 In 1994, he was elected Speaker – a position he
would hold until his resignation in 2015.10 As Speaker, Silver was one
of New York’s most powerful public officials who “[controlled]
everything from the legislation that can be voted on to how his normally
docile members vote on it.”11
In 2015, Silver was convicted of seven counts of “honest services
fraud,” extortion and money laundering for his role in two kickback
schemes involving nearly $4 million in payments he received.12 The
two different schemes shared the same premise: in exchange for official
acts, Silver received referral fees from third party law firms.13
This section outlines the elements necessary for the government to
succeed on charges of honest services fraud and Hobbs Act Extortion.
Then, it outlines the facts of Mr. Silver’s two schemes: the
“Mesothelioma Scheme” and “Real Estate Scheme.” Finally, it
discusses his trial, conviction, the Supreme Court’s holding in U.S. v
McDonnell, and the appellate court’s decision to overturn Mr. Silver’s
conviction.
A. Elements of Honest Services Fraud and Hobbs Act Extortion
The law governing public corruption is notoriously confusing. The
government often prosecutes individuals under multiple statutes for the
same underlying conduct – bribery.14 Common law bribery required a
9. Ian Fisher, With Cuomo’s Loss, Speaker is Top Democrat in Albany, NEW YORK TIMES
(November 22, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/22/nyregion/with-cuomo-s-loss-speaker-is-topdemocrat-in-albany.html.
10. United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2017).
11. Danny Hakim and Thomas Kaplan, Bad Week is Merely Bump for Assembly’s Master of
Power, NEW YORK TIMES (May 20, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/nyregion/silverlongtime-assembly-speaker-faces-new-call-to-quit.html.
12. Benjamin Weiser, Sheldon Silver’s 2015 Corruption Conviction Is Overturned, NEW YORK
TIMES (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/nyregion/sheldon-silvers-conviction-isoverturned.html.
13. Silver, 864 F.3d at 106.
14. Martin Flumenbaum, Brad Karp, Defining the Scope of McDonnell v United States, NEW
YORK
LAW
JOURNAL
(Oct.
24,
2017).
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2017/10/24/1025flumenbaum-p3-
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corrupt quid pro quo: a public official receives or demands something of
value from a private party, with corrupt intent, in exchange for being
influenced in the performance of an official act.15 For bribery, the
agreement itself is the crime, so it does not matter what the public
official did, but rather what he agreed to do.16 While this principle
remains the focal point in modern corruption prosecution, Congress has
enacted various statutes each of which has its own scope and intricacies.
1. Honest Services Fraud – 18 USC § 1346
Enacted in 1872, the mail and wire fraud statutes made it a federal
crime to knowingly devise or participate in a scheme to defraud that
involves the use of mail or interstate wire.17 While a typical fraud injury
is an individual deprived of money or other tangible resources, the
statute was interpreted and widely used throughout the 1970s and 80s to
prosecute public corruption.18 The theory was that public officials
defrauded the people of their right to honest services.19 However, in
1988, the Supreme Court held that the mail fraud statute was not written
to apply to public officials and thus did not prohibit schemes to defraud
the people of their right to honest services.20 In response, Congress
codified the “intangible right” theory by passing §1346.21 It defines
honest services fraud as: “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services.”22
Honest services fraud is one of the most powerful and commonly
used tools to prosecute corruption.23 This is because jurisdiction – using
interstate wire or mail in furtherance of the fraud scheme – is relatively
easy to prove.24 Also, a pattern of corrupt activity can be easily charged
as a single honest services fraud scheme.25 In response to prosecutors
defining-the-scope-of-mcdonnell-v-united-states/?slreturn=20170925155741.
15. Gregory Gilchrist, Corruption Law After McDonnell: Not Dead Yet, 165 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE at 13 (2016).
16. Randall D. Eliason, Supreme Court Narrows Federal Bribery Law in a Win For Bob
McDonnell, SIDEBARS BLOG (June 27, 2016), https://sidebarsblog.com/supreme-court-narrows-federalbribery-law-in-a-win-for-bob-mcdonnell/.
17. See 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1342 & 1346; See also Center for the Advancement of Public
Integrity (“CAPI”), Guide To Commonly Used Federal Statutes in Public Corruption Cases, 1, at 10
(Columbia Law School, 2017).
18. United States v Mandel, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
19. Id.
20. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1988).
21. See 18 U.S.C. §1346.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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extensive use, Skilling v. United States narrowed the definition to cover
only fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through
bribes or kickbacks.26
The elements for honest services fraud are: (1) a public official; (2) in
a scheme or plan to defraud; (3) accepts a bribe or kickback; (4) in
exchange for official action (the quid pro quo); and (5) violated his duty
of honest services to the public by using mail or interstate wires to carry
out the scheme.27
2. Hobbs Act Extortion – 18 USC §1951
The Hobbs Act, enacted in 1946, makes it a crime to obtain property
from another with that person’s consent under the color of official right
in a manner that affects interstate commerce.28 While the statute does
not use the term “bribery,” the Supreme Court has held that extortion
under the Hobbs Act is “the rough equivalent of what we would now
describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” 29 Therefore, in practice, both Hobbs Act
extortion and honest services fraud function the same way.30 The only
major difference is the jurisdictional hook: because the Hobbs Act is
based on the commerce clause, the corruption must affect interstate
commerce.31
The offense is “completed at the time when the public official
receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform a specific
official act.”32 Thus, under the Hobbs Act, a public official need not take
any step towards fulfilling the promised action..33 He can be found guilty
for merely agreeing to perform an official act, and does not even need
the authority to take that action.34 The government only has to show the
official obtained a payment they were not entitled to, and knew the

26. 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010).
27. Kierston Eastham Rosen, Meeting Consolidation: Why Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions
Should Consolidate Federal Bribery Statutes, 104 KY. L.J. 75 (2016); citing District Judges Association,
Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, §§ 2.56, 2.57 (Criminal Cases) (2015) (referring the reader to 18
U.S.C. § 201(b) in order to define bribery within the context of honest services fraud).
28. See CAPI supra note 17, at 6.
29. Id.; see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
30. Randall Eliason, Bob McDonnell’s New Trial Motion and the Definition of “Official Act,”
SIDEBARS BLOG (November 19, 2014), https://sidebarsblog.com/bob-mcdonnells-new-trial-motion-andthe-definition-of-official-act/.
31. Randall Eliason, Why Bob McDonnell was Convicted of Extortion, SIDEBARS BLOG (July 19,
2017), https://sidebarsblog.com/why-bob-mcdonnell-was-convicted-of-extortion/; see also CAPI supra
note 17.
32. United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2007), quoting Evans v. United States,
504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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payment was made in return for official acts.35
In summary, the elements of Hobbs Act extortion under color of
official right generally are: (1) a public official obtains, accepts, or
agrees to accept; (2) a thing of value the public official was not entitled
to; (3) knowing the payment was made in return for official acts (quid
pro quo); and (4) interstate commerce was affected.36
3. Federal Bribery Statute – 18 USC § 201
In 1962, Congress enacted 18 U.S. Code §201 – the principal federal
bribery statute.37 It requires that the public official act with corrupt
intent to engage in a quid pro quo; that is, “a specific intent to give or
receive something of value in exchange for an official act.”38 The
statute only applies to federal officials.39
In order to prosecute state and local officials, U.S. Attorneys most
commonly use honest services fraud, and Hobbs Act extortion under
color of official right.40 While both statutes still require a quid pro quo,41
the wording is vague and open to interpretation. Honest service fraud is
only a 28-word statute.42 Prosecutors like the vagueness because the
statutes can be applied to broader conduct than bribery. 43 However,
there were concerns this broadness resulted in overly zealous
prosecution.44
4. Supreme Court’s Concerns, and Lower Court Issues
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly limited
the scope of public corruption law.45 Over that time, the Court has only

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
See Rosen, supra note 27.
18 U.S. Code §201.
United States v Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999).
See CAPI, supra note 17, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Kelly Thornton, Vagueness of Statue on Corruption Stirs Dispute, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIBUNE
(January
12,
2006),
http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/uniontrib/20060112/news_1n12compare.html.
43. Id. (“I believe they're interpreting it too broadly, and that creates tremendous risks to our
judicial system and our criminal justice system and public officials who are trying to do their jobs . . .
.”).
44. See Gawey, supra note 4, at 415 (discussing United States v Siegelman where many believe
the Governor of Alabama was targeted for being a Democrat); see also Morrison v Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Jacob Eisler, McDonnell and Anti-Corruption’s Last Stand, 50 UC DAVIS L.J. 1619, 1633
(2016).
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let stand one conviction of a public figure when substantively
interpreting an anti-corruption statute.46 Thus, the Court has constructed
a rigorously high bar for both drafters of anti-corruption legislation and
federal prosecutors.47
This trend is a result of both doctrinal
requirements and substantive concerns.48 This section will first look at
these underlying explanations, and then analyze two statutory
requirements the courts have struggled with: intent, and the definition of
“official acts.”
The main doctrinal requirement the Court has recognized is the
canons of statutory interpretation.49 Because most federal corruption
statutes are vague, the courts have been forced to fill the void left by
legislatures through various canons of statutory interpretation. 50 For
instance, in Skilling, the Court relied on the principle that when there is
uncertainty surrounding a statute’s meaning, it should be subject to a
“limiting construction.”51 Because of the objective uncertainty
surrounding many of the corruption statutes, the Courts have favored a
narrow construction when interpreting and defining.
However, there are two substantive concerns the Court has identified:
the need for the criminal statutes to supply notice that satisfies the Due
Process clause of the Constitution, and a fear that over-inclusive
corruption law would “chill” representative government. The Supreme
Court addressed this first concern in Skilling: “there was considerable
disarray over the statute’s application to conduct outside [bribery].”52 It
narrowed the definition of honest service fraud to put public officials on
notice and to avoid further Due Process objections for lack of such
notice.53
In addressing the second concern, the Court has embraced a political
view that promotes a representative government motivated by
constituent services and patronage-driven.54 The line between “politics46. Id (In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258-59 (1992), the court affirmed a Hobbs Act
conviction when an official “passively” accepted a quid pro quo).
47. Id.
48. Id.at 1633-41.
49. Id. at 1634.
50. Id. at 1633-41; see also Thornton, supra note 42; see, e.g., McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 15-16
(where the court relied on the “familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis.”); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 401403 (where the Court engaged in an extensive reading of legal history to determine that the federal
honest services doctrine prohibits only bribes and kickbacks, but does not prohibit undisclosed selfdealing); see also Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 412 (Where the Court used the doctrinal tool of the statutory
interpretation principle that when a statute criminalizes conduct in a domain of extensive regulation, it
ought to be read narrowly and treated as a “scalpel” rather than a “meat axe.”).
51. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 405.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Eisler, supra note 45, at 1639.
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as-usual” and institutional corruption is hard to draw and the Court’s
concerns of chilling representative government has made it view
corruption a narrow field of exceptionally egregious and self-serving
behavior.55 In the Court’s view, these are issues for campaign financing
law, not the criminal justice system.56 The Supreme Court did not
openly articulate these concerns until McDonnell, discussed below.57
Against that backdrop, lower courts continued to struggle with two
corruption requirements: intent, and the definition of “official act.”58
The federal bribery statute includes the intent of “corruptly,” an unusual
and poorly defined mindset that does not fall under the normal
classifications of purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence.59
The Supreme Court addressed the intent component of corruption
statutes in United States v Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the first
in their modern line of corruption narrowing holdings.60 But, SunDiamond only focused on illegal “gratuities” in terms of § 201.61 Later
Supreme Court decisions also failed to give lower courts clarity on the
intent requirement or the definition of “official act.” The general
premise of corruption remained the same: public officials should not
receive or demand a thing of value, with corrupt intent, in exchange for
being influenced in the performance of an official act.62 But the
definition of the specific elements continued on as vague areas of law
open to varying interpretations, as a former federal prosecutor stated,
“There's almost no fact pattern that cannot be fit around.”63
B. The Mesothelioma Scheme
As courts continued to struggle with interpretation of corruption
statutes, clever officials continued to take advantage of their positions,
perhaps none more infamously than Sheldon Silver. Of the two schemes
that Silver engaged in, the more profitable was his exchange of grants
and other acts for Mesothelioma patient referrals. In the fall of 2002,
Silver became “of counsel” to the New York firm Weitz & Luxenberg
55. Id. at 1630 and 1641.
56. Id. at 1637-38; see also Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 15 and 18 (“But many of the problems
are rooted in election and campaign finance law, not our criminal justice system.”).
57. McDonnell 579 U.S. at 22-24(2016).
58. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 12.
59. Id.
60. 526 U.S. at 404-405 (1999).
61. Id.
62. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 11.
63. Roger Parloff, The Catchall Fraud Law that Catches Too Much, FORTUNE (January 6, 2010)
http://archive.fortune.com/2010/01/04/magazines/fortune/fraud_law.fortune/index.htm?postversion=201
0010609.
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(“W&L”).64 While Silver did not perform any legal services for the
firm’s clients, he received a fixed salary, and a set percent referral fee
for any case he brought the firm.65 W&L was particularly successful
with lawsuits involving mesothelioma, a rare form of cancer caused by
exposure to asbestos.66 In 2003, Silver struck up a friendship with Dr.
Robert Taub, a physician and researcher who specialized in
mesothelioma.67 Dr. Taub sought to develop the relationship in order to
receive state and federal research funding, and testified that he believed
Silver would benefit personally from such a relationship.68
In November 2003, upon Silver’s request, Dr. Taub began referring
mesothelioma patients to W&L.69 Later, Dr. Taub sent a letter to Silver
requesting state funding, and in March 2005, Silver received his first
referral fee check from W&L for $176,048.02.70 Soon after, Silver
secured a $250,000 state grant for Taub, followed by a second in August
2006.71 These grants originated from a pool of discretionary funds that
Silver had exclusive control over as Speaker.72 Neither grant, nor any of
Silver and Taub’s interactions, was ever publicly disclosed.73
In 2007, New York law changed to require public disclosure of state
healthcare grants and any potential conflicts of interest between
legislators and recipients of the grants.74 In response, Silver notified Dr.
Taub that any additional requests for state grants would not be
approved.75 However, Dr. Taub continued his referrals to Silver in order
to maintain their relationship and to keep Silver “incentivized.”76 When
Taub started sending leads to another firm in 2010, Silver went to
Taub’s office to complain.77 Following the meeting, Dr. Taub again
began sending referrals to Silver, remarking in an email to a colleague,
“I will keep giving cases to [Silver] because I may need him in the
future – he is the most powerful man in New York State.”
Although Silver did not approve any more grants after August 2006,
he did continue to help Dr. Taub in other ways. In January 2007 Silver’s
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Silver, 864 F.3d at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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staff asked a state trial judge to hire Dr. Taub’s daughter as an unpaid
extern.78 In May 2008 Silver awarded $25,000 in state grant funding to a
non-profit, whose board included Dr. Taub’s wife.79 In May 2011, Silver
had his staff prepare, and he sponsored, an Assembly resolution with an
official proclamation commending Dr. Taub.80 In fall 2011 Silver agreed
to help Taub “navigate” the process of securing permits for a proposed
NYC charity race.81 In 2012, at Taub’s request, Silver helped Taub’s son
obtain a job with a state agency.82 Dr. Taub continued to send
mesothelioma leads to Silver through at least 2013, and in total, Silver
received roughly $3 million in referral fees from W&L.83
C. The Real Estate Scheme
Silver’s second scheme involved two major New York real estate
developers: Glenwood Management (“Glenwood”) and the Witkoff
Group (“Witkoff”).84 The companies depended heavily on favorable
state legislation such as rent control and tax abatement.85 As Speaker,
Silver determined which legislation was voted on. Moreover, the
Developers depended heavily on tax-exempt financing as determined by
the Public Authorities Control Board (“PACB”), of which Silver was a
voting member with the power of unilaterally preventing approval of
any state financing applications.86
Like the mesothelioma scheme, Mr. Silver profited by receiving
referral fees from a third-party law firm. Silver’s close friend and former
staffer, Jay Goldberg, was an attorney who specialized in tax certiorari
work, something the Developers pursued in order to reduce property
taxes on their buildings.87 Silver induced the Developers to hire
Goldberg, who secretly agreed to pay Silver 25% of the legal fees.88 In
1997, Silver referred Glenwood to Goldberg, and did the same for
Witkoff in 2005.89 While neither developer knew of Silver’s financial
arrangements with Goldberg, they both testified they gave work to

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 109.
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Goldberg to gain access to Silver and influence his legislative work.90
In return, Silver took actions to benefit the Developers. First, he
repeatedly voted, over the course of his tenure as a member of PACB, to
approve Glenwood’s requests for tax-exempt financing.91 Second, Silver
regularly approved and voted for rent and tax abatement legislation
sought by Glenwood. For example, in June 2011, Silver met with
Glenwood lobbyists to ensure their satisfaction with proposed legislation
(“The Glenwood Meeting”).92 Silver supported and voted in favor of
this legislation, as well as tax abatement legislation later that month,
both to the benefit of Glenwood.93 Lastly, in 2011, Silver publicly
opposed the relocation of an addiction treatment clinic that was to be
located near a Glenwood rental building.94
Silver kept his financial arrangement with Goldberg a secret from the
developers, confessing the arrangement to Glenwood only after
Goldberg sent Glenwood a new retainer agreement that referenced
Silver.95 Witkoff did not learn of the arrangement until Goldberg
admitted to it after receiving a subpoena in connection to Silver’s
investigation.96 Over 18 years, Silver received in total $835,000 in
referral fees.97
D. Trial and Conviction
In February 2015, Silver was indicted on four counts of honest
service fraud, two counts of Hobbs Act extortion, and one count of
money laundering.98 The theory was that Silver accepted bribes and
kickbacks in exchange for “official acts.”99
Silver’s trial began in November, and one of the most hotly contested
issues was the jury instruction’s definition of “official act.”100 Silver
advocated for a definition of “official act” according to the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3): “an ‘official act’ means any
decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or
controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 110.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 111.
Id.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 6

1334

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity.”101
After the court rejected this instruction, Silver proposed an alternative:
“‘The government must prove the exercise of actual governmental
power, the threat to exercise such power, or pressure imposed on others
to exercise actual government power.”102 The government urged, and the
court ultimately adopted, a much broader definition: “official action
includes any action taken or to be taken under color of official
authority.”103
A crucial aspect of the prosecution was application of the five-year
statute of limitations for both honest services fraud and Hobbs Act
extortion. For the statute of limitations to be satisfied, the jury had to
find that some aspect of the scheme continued on or after February 19,
2010.104 Without such a finding, the jury was required to acquit on that
charge.105
After three days of deliberation, the jury found Silver guilty on all
seven counts.106 The District Court sentenced Silver to twelve years of
imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $5.4 million in
forfeiture, and a $1.75 million fine.107
On May 13, 2016, Silver motioned to appeal.108 Silver’s motion relied
largely on arguments about the definition of “official act” raised in
McDonnell v United States, which was then pending before the Supreme
Court.109 On June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell and
on August 25, 2016, the District Court granted Silver’s motion for
appeal.110 It stated that while Silver’s case is “factually almost nothing
like McDonnell… there is a substantial question whether, in light of
McDonnell, the jury charge was in error and [if that] error was
harmless.”111
E. McDonnell v United States
The Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v United States,
fundamentally changed corruption prosecution by narrowing the

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id at 112.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 112.
Id.
Id at 112-3.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 113.
Id.
Id.
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definition of an “official act.”112 Robert McDonnell, former Governor
of Virginia, was charged with honest services fraud and Hobbs act
extortion after he and his wife accepted $175,000 worth in loans, gifts,
and other benefits from a Virginia businessman.113 The government
alleged the Governor committed five “official acts” in exchange for the
gifts, including arranging meetings with state officials, hosting events at
the Governor’s Mansion for the business’ benefit, and contacting,
promoting, and recommending the business to government officials.114
In overturning McDonnell’s convictions, the Supreme Court sought
to bring clarity to the definition of “official act” contained in the federal
bribery statute, and applied that definition to both Hobbs Act extortion
and honest services fraud.115 While the federal bribery statute defines
“official act” as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause,
suit, proceeding or controversy,” neither of the other statutes contained
any definition.116 The Court’s concern was that under a broad
interpretation, nearly anything a public official accepts, such as
campaign contributions or lunch, qualifies as a quid; and nearly
anything a public official does, such as arranging meetings or inviting
guests to events, counts as a quo.117 Because public officials’ purpose in
a representative government is to hear from and act on behalf of
constituents, such a broad interpretation would have a chilling effect on
public officials’ ability to do the very job they were elected to
perform.118 This interpretation would put elected officials at risk of
indictment any time they provided heightened access to contributors.119
The Court held that an “official act” for any of the three discussed
federal bribery statutes meant “any decision or action on any question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time
be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official,
in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or
profit.”120 The Court set forth a two-prong test to meet this definition.121
112. McDonnell, 579 U.S. 1.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id at 13.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 22 (“But conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other
officials on their behalf, and include them in events all the time. The basic compact underlying
representative government assumes that public officials will hear from their constituents and act
appropriately on their concerns . . . Officials might wonder whether they could respond to even the most
commonplace requests for assistance, and citizens with legitimate concerns might shrink from
participating in democratic discourse. This concern is substantial.”).
118. Id.
119. Brief for the Petitioner at 40, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, No.15-474 (Feb. 29, 2016).
120. McDonnell, 579 U.S. 1 at 21.
121. Id.
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For the first prong, not just any “question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy” qualifies.122 Rather, that issue must involve:
(1) A formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in
nature to a lawsuit before a court, a determination before an
agency, or hearing before a committee;
(2) It must also be something specific and focused (general
economic development does not qualify); and
(3) It must be an issue that is either:
(a) Pending; or
(b) May by law be brought before a public official 123
To state more succinctly, the official act must involve: (1) a formal
exercise of governmental power; (2) on a specific and focused issue; and
(3) that issue must be either pending or may by law be brought before a
public official.124
For the second prong to be satisfied, “the public official must make a
decision or take an action on the ‘question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy,’ or agree to do so.”125 Such a decision or
action “may include using his official position to exert pressure on
another official to perform an ‘official act’ or to advise another official,
knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an official
act by another official.”126 Even an agreement to make a decision
qualifies.127 That agreement does not need to be explicit nor does it
need to specify the means by which the act will be performed.128 The
public official does not even have to intend to perform the act, just agree
to it.129 Also, setting up a meeting, talking to other officials, or
organizing events (or agreeing to) does not qualify without evidence
showing something more, particularly the intent to exert pressure on
another official.130
Applying this test, the Supreme Court ruled the jury instructions in
the trial court lacked three important qualifications, rendering them
significantly over-inclusive.131 First, the instructions should have stated
that the jury “must identify a ‘question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 25-27.
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or controversy’ involving the formal exercise of governmental
power.”132 Second, they should have stated “the pertinent ‘question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy’ must be something
specific and focused that is ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought before
any public official.’”133 Third, they should have included “arranging a
meeting or hosting an event to discuss a matter does not count as a
decision or action on that matter.”134 McDonnell’s convictions were
overturned because the jury could have convicted based on acts that
were not in fact illegal.135 Although controversial, the decision was
unanimous.136
F. Silver’s Conviction Overturned
Based on McDonnell, Silver appealed his conviction and argued that
the jury instruction’s definition of “official act” was now erroneous.137
As in McDonnell, the Second Circuit held that Silver’s jury instructions
were over-inclusive.138 In fact at trial, the government expressly urged
the jury to convict because an official act “is not limited to voting on a
bill, making a speech, passing legislation, it is not limited to that, but
rather, includes any action taken or to be taken under color of official
authority.”139 The Court reasoned that although the instructions given
were consistent with precedent at the time, the conviction must be
overturned because, under McDonnell, it was possible a rational jury
could have convicted without finding the proper quid pro quo
elements.140
Because the statute of limitations only captured conduct occurring
after February 19, 2010, only three proven acts in the Mesothelioma
scheme applied: agreeing to assist Taub with acquiring permits for a
charity race, helping Taub’s son get a job, and obtaining an assembly
resolution honoring Taub.141 The Court ruled that agreeing to assist in
acquiring permits and writing a letter on behalf of Dr. Taub’s son did
not satisfy the standards for an official act because there was not
sufficient evidence to conclude that Silver exerted pressure on other

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 106.
Id.
Id at 118.
Id.
Id at 120.
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officials.142
Thus, the only act remaining within the statute of limitations was the
assembly resolution honoring Dr. Taub.143 While the Court described
that it was clearly a formal exercise of government power on a specific
matter, it held that a rational jury could conclude such action is so
commonplace as to be worthy of being a quid.144
While none of the acts within the statute of limitations qualified under
McDonnell, the court agreed the government only needed to prove that
some aspect of the quid pro quo scheme continued into the statute of
limitation period.145 However, the Court ruled that a rational jury could
have found that the quid pro quo could have ended upon Silver’s
notifying Taub he would not receive any more grants, long before the
statute of limitations period began to run in 2010.146
In the Real Estate Scheme, the government had identified four actions
within the statute of limitation: Silver’s PACB votes for bond approvals,
Silver’s opposition to a methadone clinic near a Glenwood property,
meetings with Glenwood lobbyists prior to the passage of crucial 2011
legislation, and Silver’s continuous approval of other legislation that
benefited the developers.147 However, each of these acts struggled to
qualify as ‘official acts’ under the McDonnell standard.
The Court held that a juror could reasonably conclude the PACB
approvals were too perfunctory to be regarded as a quo – especially
because the government witness stated that, in his experience, the PACB
approved every financing request.148 The Court also concluded that
since taking a public position on an issue by itself is not a formal
exercise of governmental power, Silver’s public opposition to the
methadone clinic was not an “official act” under McDonnell.149
Furthermore, because the jury instruction did not specifically instruct
that a meeting by itself is not official action, it was possible the jury
improperly concluded the “Glenwood Meeting” was an “official act.”150
The Court noted the Glenwood meeting was the most compelling
evidence the jury could have relied on to conclude Silver understood
and intended a quid pro quo agreement.151 Without this piece of
evidence, a rational jury with proper instructions could conclude that
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id at 121.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id.
Silver, 864 F.3d at 123.
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Silver’s actions were not part of a quid pro quo.152 Because the court
could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would
have convicted Silver if given the proper instructions, the judgment of
conviction was vacated and remanded.153
As in McDonnell, the court acknowledged that while its decision may
be unpopular and distasteful, the Court was simply upholding the
current law.154 The Court stated they cannot make a decision on what a
jury would likely do, but rather only if it is clear beyond reasonable
doubt that a jury would have found Silver guilty.155 Under the current
McDonnell standard, they were unable to do so.156
III. DISCUSSION
While many have been critical of the ruling in McDonnell and the
effects it will have on public corruption, its holding does not mean the
end of anti-corruption prosecution. While the McDonnell standard
makes prosecution of corrupt public officials harder, Congress enacted
vague statutes, and the Court sought to interpret them in a way that
provides a bright-line rule. This limited scope added needed clarity to
bribery law by providing notice to politicians of what they can and
cannot do and reined in prosecution of some perfectly legal functions of
representative government. Sheldon Silver’s retrial will be a case study
of the immediate repercussions the new bribery standard and the future
landscape of anti-corruption law.
These sections first discuss what the landscape of anti-corruption law
will look like going forward, and then apply that to predict the likely
outcome of what Silver’s retrial should be. Next, it looks at the
immediate repercussions for prosecutors and other already convicted
corrupt public officials. Last, it offers up solutions that work in
conjuncture with McDonnell that will make it harder to get away with
public corruption.
A. It’s All About Intent – Future of Anti-Corruption Law
Chief Justice Roberts knew his McDonnell opinion would be
unpopular and stated: “There is no doubt that this case is distasteful; it
may be worse than that.”157 Predictably, the decision was received with
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id at 124.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 28.
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some degree of panic.158 The voting public unilaterally reviles
corruption and the ruling certainly makes prosecution harder. Critics
have expounded concerns that McDonnell creates a zone of “softcorruption” that may be legal, especially when disguised as campaign
contributions.159
On the other hand, the opinion provided much needed clarity to a
vague and confusing area of law. It established a bright-line rule that
drew a logical marker between what constitutes corruption and what is
ordinary “politics-as-usual.”160 This section first discusses the future of
corruption prosecution and the likely shift of prosecutorial focus
towards evidence that establishes two things: the existence of a corrupt
agreement, and proving intent to exert pressure. 161 Next, it discusses
positive results of McDonnell and explains the holding does not kill
anti-corruption law; it merely narrows and clarifies it.
1. Future Focus of Corruption Prosecution
While the McDonnell holding certainly limits prosecutorial power,
federal prosecutors will be able to succeed by shifting their focus
towards evidence that proves an “intent to exert pressure” and the
existence of a corrupt agreement.
Some critics believe the court has revived “pay to play” politics and
given a green light for politicians to trade access for money.162 This
argument relies on Justice Robert’s holding that setting up meetings,
calling other officials, or hosting events, standing alone, do not qualify
as an “official act.”163 Although this zone of “soft-corruption” may seem
to be deemed acceptable by McDonnell, these critics have
misinterpreted the holding.
The Court was saying that a meeting or event can still constitute
corruption, it just is not enough evidence on its own to warrant a
conviction. Thus, the first check on corruption that McDonnell leaves is

158. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 12; see, e.g., Amy Davidson, The Supreme Court’s BriberyNEW
YORKER
(June
27,
2016),
Blessing
McDonnell
Decision,
THE
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/the-supreme-courts-bribery-blessingmcdonnelldecision (“The Court, in Citizens United and now in McDonnell, has looked upon the worst, most
endemically corrupt aspects of American politics and enshrined them.”).
159. Id. at 19.
160. Christopher Murphy, McDonnell v United States: Defining “Official Action” in Public
Corruption Law, 12 DUKE L. REV. 269, 283 (2016).
161. Id.
162. See Josh Gerstein, McDonnell Ruling a Big Blow to Corruption Law, POLITICO (June 26,
2016, 7:50 pm), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/mcdonnell-ruling-seen-blessing-pay-to-play224855.
163. McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 21.
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its own holding.164 The qualifying language of the decision is key to the
future of anti-corruption prosecution: intent to exert pressure.165
Influential meetings are fine, but an effort or intention to pressure those
with decision-making is corrupt. Thus, McDonnell covers conduct
where a public official exerts pressure or undue influence on other
public officials.166 Engaging with other officials is an essential, everyday
aspect of politicians’ jobs, so the second they cross the line into exerting
pressure, or show the intention to do so, they are open to prosecution.
The “intent to exert pressure” standard is clearer cut than the previous
standard of “corruptly.” In a post-McDonnell world, prosecutors will
now look to evidence that shows an exertion of pressure or a differential
power structure through, for example, the settings of meetings, who
joined those meetings, or any correspondence that shows the officials
alluding to their public authority or any information or authority that
could be leveraged.167 Prosecutors should also look for any prior “tit-fortat” or promotional actions based on willingness to accede to pressure.
For example, one key piece of evidence in McDonnell that may not have
garnered the attention it deserved was a pro/con list drafted by a
University of Virginia employee.168 “The first ‘pro’ was the ‘perception
to the Governor that UVA would like to work with local companies, and
the first ‘con’ was the political pressure from Governor and impact on
future UVA requests from the Governor.”169 This is the type of evidence
that prosecutors will look for to show a politician is intending to
wrongfully exert pressure.170
The other focus of future prosecution will be on the existence of the
agreement. One of the most substantial pieces of evidence will be the
nature of the gifts/donations the public official received.171 If there
seems to be no apparent or legitimate reason for the politician to be
receiving the gifts, a corrupt agreement may be more readily inferred if

164. Id.
165. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 17; citing in part McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 20 (“expressing
support for [a particular policy] at a meeting, event, or call does not qualify as a decision or action on
the [policy], as long as the public official does not intend to exert pressure on another official or provide
advice, knowing or intending such advice to form the basis for an ‘official act.’ This statement, which
might be mistaken as the death knell for corruption law, includes critical qualifying language mapping
the future of anti-corruption prosecutions. It’s about intent.”).
166. Id. at 17-20; see also Murphy, supra note 160, at 284.
167. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 19-20.
168. McDonnell 579 U.S. at 11.
169. Id.
170. See Gilchrist, supra note 15.
171. Randall Eliason, Supreme Court Rejects Rod Blagojevichs Appeal: Monty Python and Public
Corruption, SIDEBARS BLOG (April 7, 2016), https://sidebarsblog.com/supreme-court-rejects-rodblagojevichs-appeal-monty-python-and-public-corruption/.
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the politician then acts in favor of the donor.172 This is especially true if
the gifts are secret and unrelated to campaign fundraising.173
However, this will be much harder to prove with campaign
contributions. A central feature of our democracy is that donors can
contribute to politicians they support and have shared beliefs with, and
for those candidates to later act in favor of those donor’s interests.174
First the prosecution must look at the nature of the contributions and see
if they are within the relevant legal limit, or if they show up on any
required public campaign financing report. Proof of that will be hard to
find, so the focus must be on the corrupt agreement itself. While the
evidence must prove that an explicit agreement existed, that agreement
does not need to be expressed.175 Therefore circumstantial evidence can
be used, and a quid pro quo agreement can be implied from words or
actions and the totality of the evidence surrounding the transaction.176
The new standard is tougher to prove, but constant advancements in
technology helps make politics more transparent and communications
harder to hide.177 This is one advantage that federal prosecutors can
utilize to help find evidence to satisfy the stringent requirements of
current corruption law.
2. Positive Results of McDonnell
While many have criticized McDonnell,178 it has brought clarity to a
confusing area of law.179 With the vaguely worded and broadly
interpreted corruption statutes prosecutors use, convictions were
susceptible to unconstitutional vagueness attacks.180 By establishing a
bright-line rule, public officials are sufficiently put on notice,
constitutional due process concerns are alleviated, and politicians know
what are, and what are not, legal constituent services.
Chief Justice Roberts said the Court sought to put the brakes on a
“pall of potential prosecution” that could disrupt the healthy functioning

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Mark Anderson, A Christmas Future: Bribery and Corruption in 2022, PWC (December 7,
2016)
http://pwc.blogs.com/fraud_academy/2016/12/a-christmas-future-bribery-and-corruption-in2022.html.
178. Davidson, supra note 158 (“The Court . . . in McDonnell, has looked upon the worst, most
endemically corrupt aspects of American politics and enshrined them.”).
179. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 18-20.
180. See Gawey, supra note 44, at 413.
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of democratic discourse.181 The decision also quoted White House
lawyers who expressed concern that the “breathtaking expansion of
public-corruption law would likely chill federal officials interactions
with the people.”182 The Court was clear in their intention to create a
narrower standard aimed to protect representative government.
B. Expected Retrial of Sheldon Silver
Immediately after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
Silver’s convictions, the U.S. Attorney’s office expressed optimism in
convicting Silver on retrial.183 Former U.S. Attorney Bharara tweeted
that the evidence was strong and he expects Silver to again be
convicted.184 Jury selection has been scheduled for April 16, 2018;
however, the McDonnell standard and five-year statute of limitations
will make it harder for the government.185 This section examines
application of McDonnell on the Silver retrial and specifically the
“Mesothelioma Scheme,” and “Real Estate Scheme.”
1. Mesothelioma Scheme
While the statute of limitations only captures conduct occurring after
February 19, 2010, the government needs to prove that some aspect of
the quid pro quo continued into the statutory period.186 The evidence of
Silver’s quid pro quo is strong, and will almost certainly qualify, but it
will be harder proving the agreement lasted into the statutory period.
The easiest way for the prosecution to prove existence of a quid pro quo
is to establish Silver’s 2005 agreement to provide Dr. Taub with state
181. McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 22.
182. Id.
183. See Joon H. Kim, Statement of Acting U.S. Attorney on Second Circuit Decision In United
States v Sheldon Silver, Department of Justice (July 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/pr/statement-acting-us-attorney-joon-h-kim-second-circuit-decision-united-states-v-sheldon:
(“While we are disappointed by the Second Circuit’s decision, we respect it, and look forward to
retrying the case. Although finding that the Supreme Court’s McDonnell decision issued after Silver’s
conviction required a different legal instruction to the jury, the Second Circuit also held that the
evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to prove all the crimes charged against Silver, even under
the new legal standard. Although this decision puts on hold the justice that New Yorkers got upon
Silver’s conviction, we look forward to presenting to another jury the evidence of decades-long
corruption by one of the most powerful politicians in New York State history. Although it will be
delayed, we do not expect justice to be denied.”).
184. Preet
Bharara
(@PreetBharara),
TWITTER
(July
13,
2017,
7:26am),
https://twitter.com/PreetBharara/status/885505741192409088.
185. Matthew Hamilton, Judge sets ‘likely’ re-trial date for Sheldon Silver, TIMES UNION (August
15, 2017, 3:59pm), http://www.timesunion.com/7day-state/article/Judge-sets-likely-re-trial-date-forSheldon-11821088.php.
186. Silver, 864 F.3d at 122.
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grants in exchange for referrals, and then prove that this agreement
lasted until at least February 19, 2010.
Under the first prong of the McDonnell test, the “question, matter,
cause, suit, proceeding or controversy” must be on: (1) a formal exercise
of governmental power; (2) that is specific and focused; and (3) must be
an issue that is either pending or may by law be brought before a public
official.187 Silver’s control of a discretionary pool of funds as Speaker of
the New York State Legislation certainly qualifies as a formal exercise
of governmental power. The matter at hand, whether to issue a grant to
help fund Dr. Taub’s mesothelioma research, was specific and focused,
and clearly pending before a public official as Silver had to act to secure
the grant.
Under the second prong of McDonnell, the public official must take,
or agree to take, official action on that “question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy.” Here, the agreement between Taub and
Silver is well documented in letters, emails, and Taub’s trial testimony,
and the culmination of two grants totaling $500,000 in exchange for
Silver receiving roughly $3 million in referral fees.
Although Silver notified Taub in 2007 he would no longer approve
any more grants, it is likely a jury would find that their quid pro quo
relationship existed well into the statutory period. A key piece of
evidence will be Silver’s May 25, 2010 visit to Dr. Taub’s office –
within the statutory limitations period – to demand he continue sending
referrals to W&L. While this meeting does not qualify as an “official
act,” it is strong circumstantial evidence that shows the quid pro quo
existed into the statutory period. The government only needs to prove
the existence of the agreement and Silver’s intention to take steps
towards fulfilling an action. So, while they may not be able to prove
Silver did an official act within the statutory period, this meeting proves
the agreement was still in place, especially since Silver continued to
receive payments through at least 2013.
A second route prosecution will likely pursue is proving that the May
2011 Assembly resolution with an official proclamation commending
Dr. Taub represents an “official act.” Silver sponsored the resolution and
presented it to Dr. Taub on the floor of the Assembly. This could be an
“official act” under McDonnell as it is a formal exercise of power, on a
specific and focused issue (the commendation of Dr. Taub), which may
be brought before a public official. But McDonnell also states that while
public appearances can constitute official action, they rarely, if ever,
will if of strictly a ceremonial nature.188 The jury could decide that such

187. McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 21.
188. See Gilchrist, supra note 15, at 17.
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an action, in conjuncture with the ongoing referral payments to Silver, is
sufficient to constitute a quid pro quo. Even if not, the resolution is still
strong evidence the quid pro quo lasted into the statutory period.
2. Real Estate Scheme
On retrial, the McDonnell standard will make it significantly harder
for the prosecution in the “Real Estate Scheme.” The evidence shows
Silver routinely approved and voted for favorable legislation, as well as
repeatedly voted to approve the Developers PACB/tax-exempt financing
requests. It also plainly establishes that he received referral fees.
However, the problem with the Real Estate scheme will be proving the
pro – the linkage between the passage of votes and referrals.
The key piece of evidence in the “Real Estate Scheme” was Silver’s
meeting with Glenwood lobbyists prior to the passage of legislation.189
During the government’s closing, they expressly argued this meeting, by
itself, was an official action. However, under McDonnell such a
meeting, on its own, is not an official act.190 The government may still
be able to prove the meeting was an official act, but only if it can admit
further evidence showing Silver held the meeting with the intent to exert
pressure. If they can, this meeting will be an “official action” within
itself, as well as a link between Silver’s continuous passages of real
estate legislation to the Developers referral fees. If the government
cannot establish intent, then convicting Silver on retrial will be difficult,
as there is little else that links an official action to the referral fees.
While the meeting could be used as circumstantial evidence proving a
quid pro quo for legislative votes, a properly instructed jury may not
find it convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.
The other two actions taken by Silver – his PACB votes and public
opposition to the methadone clinic – do not withstand McDonnell’s
definition of “official act.” Thus, the government will have a much
harder time garnering a conviction on retrial.
C. Panic in the Second Circuit?
The overturning of Sheldon Silver’s conviction illuminates a major
consequence of McDonnell: appellate attorneys phones will be ringing
off the hook from every recently convicted corrupt public official. This
will be of especial consequence in the Second Circuit, which stands to
have the biggest impact as fourteen New York State Legislators have

189. Silver, 864 F.3d at 122.
190. McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 21-22.
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been convicted in the last ten years.191
Sheldon Silver is not the only prominent New York politician to
recently avoid jail time. Dean Skelos, the former majority leader of the
New York State Senate and Republican opponent of Silver, was
convicted for Hobbs act extortion and honest services fraud.192 But in an
opinion that cited almost exclusively to McDonnell and Silver, his
conviction was overturned because the jury instructions did not meet
McDonnell.193 While the court made it clear the evidence was sufficient
to allow a properly instructed jury to convict, it is still a temporary
setback for justice against two of New York’s highest profile whitecollar criminals.194
In the same week it released its decision in Silver, the Second Circuit
released another corruption opinion: U.S. v Boyland.195 However, in
Boyland, the Court upheld his convictions.196 Although the jury
instructions in Boyland were even broader than Silver’s, the trial
attorneys failed to object and a plain error standard was applied, under
which Boyland’s convictions were upheld.197 Thus, convictions where
attorneys failed to object to jury instructions will most likely be upheld.
However, convicted public officials who did make timely objections
have a strong chance to get their conviction overturned.
This result has been felt outside the Second Circuit as well, as
corruption cases seem to be crumbling all around the U.S.198 ExLouisiana Congressman William Jefferson, who in 2009 was sentenced
to 13 years in prison – the longest sentence ever handed down to a
congressman for bribery – was recently released from prison after seven
of his ten charges were vacated.199 Chaka Fattah, former Democratic
congressman from Philadelphia, and Ray Nagin, the Ex-New Orleans
Mayor, have both filed to overturn their convictions.200 The definition of
191. The Second Circuit Clarifies Corruption Standards Following Supreme Court’s McDonnell
Decision,
CLEARY
GOTTLEIB
(July
20,
2017),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-memos/second-circuitclarifies-corruption-standards-7-21-17.pdf.
192. U.S. v. Skelos, No. 16-1618-CR, 2017 WL 4250021, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2017).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See United States v. Boyland, No. 15-3118, 2017 WL 2918840 (2d Cir. July 10, 2017).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Alan Feuer, Why Are Corruption Cases Crumbling? Some Blame the Supreme Court, NEW
YORK TIMES (November 17, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/nyregion/menendez-seabrookcorruption-cases-crumbling-.html; see also Alan Feuer, Silver May Start ‘Parade of Horribles’ Out of
McDonnell
Case,
Critics
Say,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(July
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/nyregion/sheldon-silver-bob-mcdonnell.html.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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“official act” also resulted in the mistrial of New Jersey Senator Robert
Menendez, the first sitting United States Senator to face a federal
bribery trial and verdict in decades.201
But the new landscape of corruption law may also have a chilling
effect on future corruption investigations. In March 2017, the United
States Attorney’s office in Manhattan said it would not seek charges
against Mayor Bill de Blasio after months of inquiry.202 The statement
released by the U.S. Attorney’s office stated it had found a pattern from
the mayor or his associates of soliciting contributions from favor
seeking donors, but decided not to bring a case after weighing, among
other things, the “high burden of proof” created by McDonnell.203
D. Possible Solutions
Although McDonnell has had a widespread effect on overturning
convictions, it is merely a ripple effect that is often felt when a new
legal standard is put in place. The same thing happened following
Skilling, and once these criminals face retrial under correct jury
instructions, most will be convicted again.204
Nevertheless, problems still exist because of McDonnell. Randall
Eliason has stated that the Supreme Court’s obsessive focus on
determining a narrow and overly legalistic definition of official acts
“missed the corruption forest for the trees.”205 He is right; the Court
spent their entire analysis determining the qualifications of an adequate
quo, and in doing so ignored the fundamental overarching principle of
bribery: the quid pro quo. However, McDonnell was a 9-0 unanimous
decision, and the possibility of it being overturned is not only unlikely, it
is unrealistic. The solution to stomping out corruption must be found in
other ways that work in conjuncture with McDonnell.
One theory prosecutors are likely to explore – and argue is consistent
with McDonnell – is the “stream of benefits” theory. It is used in
corruption cases where the public official is on retainer and is being
influenced in the performance of official acts as they arise.206 While it
201. Id.; see also Matt Friedman, Mistrial Declared in Menendez corruption case, POLITICO
(November 16, 2017) https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/16/menendez-jury-still-deadlocked244980.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Roger Parloff, Why White Collar Crime Just Got Harder to Battle, FORTUNE (June 25, 2010)
http://archive.fortune.com/2010/06/25/news/companies/Supreme_Court_White_Collar_Skilling.fortune/
index.htm (Both Conrad Black and Bruce Weyhrauch had their convictions overturned and retried under
the standard set forth in Skilling.).
205. See Eliason, supra note 1.
206. Randall Eliason, The Menendez Trial and the Future of Bribery, SIDEBARS BLOG (October
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might not be possible to prove a direct link between any gift and any
particular official act, what is charged is the continuing corrupt
relationship.207
The Supreme Court has never weighed in on this theory but it has
been widely accepted in the lower courts.208 It could potentially survive
McDonnell as “I’ll give you a stream of benefits over time, in exchange
you agree to do things for me, as opportunities arise, that qualify as
official acts.”209 So while the parties agree the official will perform
official acts, what those acts will be is undetermined at the time of the
agreement.210
The government in the Robert Menendez trial presented this theory,
but since it resulted in a mistrial we will have to wait and see if judges
believe it has survived McDonnell.211 If the Supreme Court were to
consider and approve application of the stream of benefits theory, it
would certainly help prosecutors deal with the negative effect of
McDonnell.
Some have proposed unifying all federal bribery statutes. 212 Because
the courts have essentially interpreted the federal bribery statutes to all
function the same way, it is not too far-fetched to suggest an
interpretation that completely unifies the definitions. However,
Congress wrote the statutes with differing definitions and intentions, and
it seems unlikely that absent congressional action, the current Supreme
Court would adopt such an approach.
Rather than unify the statutes, others have suggested the opposite
approach, which is that the definition of “official act” should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.213 Courts could chose to set up a
flexible standard and leave the responsibility of defining “official act”
up to the discretion of the trial judge or jury.214 Or in a more practical
application of this idea, the definition of “official act” could be defined
under whatever the most localized bribery law the public official served
in reads. For example, if Cincinnati had a municipal bribery law, and
federal prosecutors indicted the Mayor for honest services fraud and
Hobbs Act extortion, official act would be defined as it is in the
Cincinnati statute. So on for state-level officials, leaving federal officials
to be prosecuted under the definition of § 201, as is the standard in
20, 2017), https://sidebarsblog.com/menendez-bribery-stream-benefits/.
207. Id.
208. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2011).
209. Eliason, supra note 206.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Rosen, supra note 27.
213. See Murphy, supra note 160, at 285.
214. Id.
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McDonnell.
However, the entire problem discussed is a result of poor legislation,
both on the federal and state levels. Congress passed vague legislation,
while some state statutes, like Virginia’s in McDonnell, failed to
adequately address corruption. The Supreme Court was forced to rewrite
the federal corruption statutes to protect the line between constituent
services and graft. If Congress does not like the result, they should pass
new laws that are not as vague. This is exactly what happened in 1988
when Congress enacted honest service fraud, which came because of the
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally.215
For the states, McDonnell sent a clear message to local legislators that
it was time for them to step up and write effective anti-corruption laws.
McDonnell was only an interpretation of the definition of “official act”
for the federal bribery and honest service fraud statutes; it does not
affect state and local corruption laws. McDonnell showed the Supreme
Court is unwilling to use federal bribery laws to pick up the slack in
states like Virginia that have lax ethics regulations.216 The Court
strongly insinuated the problem is not with the federal criminal justice
system, but rather rooted in election and campaign finance law, weak
state and local legislation, and the corrupt officials themselves.217
Another solution is to increase the statutory period for bribery charges
from five years to ten. Currently, all mail and wire fraud crimes have a
statute of limitation for five years, except for schemes that affect
financial institutions, which extends to ten years.218 The reasoning is that
by expanding the statute of limitations, Congress has put a priority on
protecting financial institutions and aims to deter criminals from
including financial institutions in their schemes.219 Congress is saying
that defrauding financial institutions is such a severe crime that
punishment should be easier to establish.
Under the same logic, Congress should extend the statute of
limitations for bribery charges to ten years. As shown in Silver, the
addition of five years to the statutory period would make a crucial
difference in prosecution.220 As our very own Constitution equates
corruption to treason, it certainly is of equal severity, if not more so,

215. Randall Eliason, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption From Sea to Shining
Sea, SIDEBARS BLOG (March 30, 2015), https://sidebarsblog.com/federal-prosecution-of-state-and-localcorruption-from-sea-to-shining-sea/.
216. See Gerstein, supra note 162.
217. Gilchrist, supra note 56, at 12, 18.
218. United States Attorney Manual 9-43.100 CRM 968 – Statute of Limitations; see also 18
U.S.C. §3293.
219. United States v. Serpico, 320 F.3d 691,693-694 (7th Cir. 2003).
220. Silver, 864 F.3d at 220.
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than defrauding financial institutions.221 Moreover, rooting out
corruption is harder and takes longer to track. Pulling long lists of
campaign contributions is easy, but finding the underlying corrupt
agreement takes a long time. Politicians are highly intelligent people
who make a living by convincing others that they are right. This makes
finding convincing evidence of a corrupt agreement even harder.
Accordingly, prosecutors should be given a longer timetable from which
to build a case, and as shown in Silver, the difference a five-year
extension to the statutory period would make for a crucial modification
to prosecution.
Ultimately, the most viable and most effective tool against corruption
is the voting public. The United States is a government of checks and
balances, so corrupt, or seemingly corrupt public officials must be held
accountable by the most powerful tool in democracy: the ballot box.
While Bob McDonald escaped jail time, he will never have the
opportunity to defraud citizens of his honest services because he will
never hold public office again. Beyond holding corrupt public officials
accountable, voters must elect officials committed to passing commonsense anti-corruption and campaign finance law in order to protect the
future of our country from corrupt governing officials.
The simplest and easiest way to advance both of these objectives is
for states to pass extensive disclosure laws, such as the ones New York
passed that forced Silver to discontinue providing grants to Dr. Taub.
Imagine the results on election night if the people of Virginia had known
that Bob McDonald was accepting $175,000 in gifts from a specific
businessman. Voters should be able to know the politicians they support
have not succumbed to corruption, and the best way to ensure that voters
have access to that knowledge is through such disclosure laws.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the holding in McDonnell has set the bar high for prosecuting
public corruption high, it brought much needed clarity to a confusing
area of the law and brought a balance to the competing interests of
federal anti-corruption laws and protection of a representative
democracy. While it has resulted in many recent convictions being
overturned, this ripple effect will soon subside, as each criminal who
should be tried under the appropriate McDonnell jury instructions will
have had his day in court. As prosecutors begin to focus on evidence
that proves the existence of a corrupt agreement and the intent to exert
pressure, those public officials who are corrupt will once again be
221. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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convicted on retrial. Only time will tell if the repercussions of
McDonnell will be mostly positive or not, but either way, the new
standard set forth in the 9-0 unanimous decision is here to stay. To the
extent our Country is committed to stomping out corruption, there are
alternative solutions outside overturning McDonnell that warrant serious
consideration.
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